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L A B 0 R L A W
Do Agency Employees Have a Right
to Union Representation When Questioned
by an OIG Investigator?
by Barbara J. Fick
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 345-348. © 1999 American Bar Association.
This case involves the interpretation
of, and interplay between, two fed-
eral statutes-the Inspector General
Act and the Federal Service Labor-
Management Relations Statute
(FSLMRS). The Inspector General
Act creates independent and objec-
tive units within federal depart-
ments and agencies for the purpose
of conducting audits of, and investi-
gations into, the programs and oper-
ations of these departments and
agencies. Each Office of Inspector
General (OIG) within a federal
agency is headed by an inspector
general who is appointed by the
president and may be removed from
office only by the president. In per-
forming its functions, the OIG
reports to, and is under the general
supervision of, the head of the fed-
eral agency within which the office
is located, but an agency head can-
not prohibit or prevent the OIG
from initiating, carrying out, or
completing an investigation or
audit.
The FSLMRS grants federal employ-
ees the right to join labor unions
and engage in collective bargaining
with agency management. It is an
unfair labor practice for a federal
employer to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed by the statute.
Section 7114 of the FSLMRS grants
employees the right to union repre-
sentation at "any examination of an
employee by a representative of the
agency in connection with an inves-
tigation" in which the employee rea-
sonably believes the examination
may result in disciplinary action.
ISSUES
The Supreme Court is asked to
determine two questions arising
from the interplay between these
statutes. When an investigator from
the OIG conducts an investigatory
interview of an agency employee, is
the investigator a "representative of
the agency" so as to trigger the
employee's right to union represen-
tation at the interview? If so, is the
(Continued on Page 346)





FROM: THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Barbara J. Fick is an associate
professor of law at Notre Dame
Law School; (219) 631-5864
or fick.l@nd.edu
federal agency itself liable for com-
mitting an unfair labor practice if
the investigator fails to grant the
employee his or her rights under
§7114?
FACTS
In 1993, the Office of Inspector
General for NASA (NASA-OIG)
received information from the FBI
that a NASA employee at the
Marshall Space Flight Center in
Huntsville, Ala., was suspected of
sending documents threatening bod-
ily harm to co-workers. An investi-
gator from NASA-OIG contacted the
suspected employee to set up an
interview. The suspected employee
was a member of a bargaining unit
represented by Local 3434 of the
American Federation of
Government Employees ("the
union"). The employee requested
both legal and union representation
at the interview, and the investiga-
tor agreed.
At the beginning of the interview,
the investigator informed the partic-
ipants that certain ground rules
would apply. Specifically, the inves-
tigator said that the union represen-
tative was present as a witness and
was not to interrupt the question-
and-answer process. The union rep-
resentative was also informed that
he was subject to being called as a
witness for the government. The
union representative objected to the
rules, but the investigator said that
he would move the interview else-
where if the union representative
did not "maintain himself."
Moreover, at several points during
the interview, the investigator chal-
lenged the union representative's
conduct when he attempted to rep-
resent the employee.
The union subsequently filed a
charge with the Federal Labor
Relations Authority (FLRA)-the
agency responsible for enforcing the
FSLMRS-alleging that both NASA
and NASA-OIG had violated the
FSLMRS by interfering with the
union's right to take an active role
during the examination of the
employee. A hearing was held
before an administrative law judge
of the FLRA. The judge found that
NASA-OIG was acting as a "repre-
sentative of the agency" when it was
conducting the employee interview
and that it had committed an unfair
labor practice by interfering with
the union's ability to participate in
the interview. The judge dismissed
the charge against NASA itself, find-
ing that there was no evidence that
NASA was responsible for the
violation.
Upon appeal of the administrative
law judge's decision to the FLRA,
the FLRA agreed that the NASA-
OIG investigator was "a representa-
tive of the agency" and that the
ground rules established for the
interview were contrary to the
rights guaranteed by §7114. The
FLRA disagreed with the judge's
findings as to NASA's liability and
found that NASA was responsible
for the actions of the NASA-OIG
investigator.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit enforced the
FLRA's decision, deferring to the
FLRA's interpretation that "repre-
sentative of the agency" as used in
§7114 includes inspector general
investigators. The court also found
NASA liable for the unfair labor
practice on the theory that it exer-
cises supervisory authority over
NASA-OIG and therefore had a duty
to ensure that the OIG complies
with the requirements of the
FSLMRS. FLRA v. NASA, 120 F.3d
1208 (11th Cir. 1997).
The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari on Nov. 2, 1998.
ANALYSIS
The FSLMRS guarantees an employ-
ee's right to union representation
during an investigative interview
only when the interview is conduct-
ed by a "representative of the
agency." Thus, if a police officer
were to interview an employee to
determine whether the employee
had embezzled employer funds, the
employee would not be entitled to
union representation. The police
officer is not acting as a representa-
tive of the employer; he or she is
not employed by the employer and
acts independently of the employ-
er's interests. On the other hand, if
a security guard employed by the
employer were to interview an
employee to determine if the
employee had stolen money, the
right to union representation would
attach. The security guard is
employed by the employer and con-
ducts the investigation on behalf of
the employer; he or she is acting as
the employer's representative. The
OIG occupies a position somewhere
between a police officer and a secu-
rity guard.
NASA points to the fact that the
inspector general is appointed by
the president and may be removed
only by the president as evidence of
the OIG's independence from
agency management. Moreover, the
Inspector General Act expressly
provides that agency management
cannot interfere with an OIG inves-
tigation. This independence is nec-
essary to insulate the OIG from
management attempts to cover up
its own fraud or ineffectiveness and
thus ensures the OIG can carry out
its mission. The results of an OIG
investigation are reported to
Congress and the head of the
agency involved, but the OIG does
not impose punishment. It is up to
the agency itself to determine the
appropriate sanction based on the
investigative findings. The structure
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and purpose behind the OIG show
that it does not act as a representa-
tive of the agency when it conducts
its investigations but is acting
independently.
The FLRA counters that the OIG
does not have unlimited indepen-
dence from the agency. OIG investi-
gators are, in fact, employees of the
agency. The Inspector General Act
specifically provides that the OIG
operates under the general supervi-
sion of the agency head. Informa-
tion uncovered during an OIG
investigation may be provided to
agency supervisors to use for agency
purposes. Moreover, the OIG
receives assistance from agency
management in conducting its
investigations. The OIG does not
have the authority to compel
employee testimony; it relies on
agency management to threaten
employees with discipline for refus-
ing to cooperate. This relation
between the agency and OIG indi-
cates that OIG is acting as a "repre-
sentative of the agency" when it
conducts its investigation.
The American Federation of
Government Employees (AFGE)
notes that the term representative
as used throughout the FSLMRS
designates a person who acts for, or
on behalf of, a federal agency.
NASA-OIG is authorized to act for
NASA in conducting investigatory
interviews. Indeed, it is the respon-
sibility of the OIG to keep the
agency informed of problems and
abuses and to recommend correc-
tive action. Information obtained
during the investigation is given to
other administrative units within
the agency so that they can take
appropriate disciplinary action. In
this particular case, the NASA-OIG
investigator threatened the employ-
ee with discipline if he did not coop-
erate in the investigation. By invok-
ing NASA's disciplinary authority,
the investigator clearly showed he
was acting as a representative of the
agency.
Secondly, NASA contends that the
underlying purpose in providing for
union representation at investigato-
ry interviews suggests that a "repre-
sentative of an agency" means a
representative of the agency man-
agement that has a collective bar-
gaining relationship with the union.
The purpose of the FSLMRS is to
regulate the relationship between
union-represented employees and
the agency management that deals
with the union in collective
bargaining.
The rationale for providing union
representation rights is not only to
safeguard the particular employee,
but to protect as well the interests
of the entire bargaining unit and
make certain the employer does not
abuse its power. Union representa-
tion is designed to redress the
imbalance of economic power
between the worker and manage-
ment. Since the OIG does not con-
tain the bargaining unit to which
the employee under investigation
belongs, it cannot abuse its power
vis-A-vis that bargaining unit. Its
independence means it does not
side with either the worker or
management and thus cannot be
part of any equation to redress an
imbalance of power between those
entities.
The OIG itself does not have a col-
lective bargaining relationship with
any union. OIG employees are
expressly excluded from being part
of a union-represented bargaining
unit. Thus, OIG is not a representa-
tive of the agency for collective bar-
gaining purposes and therefore can-
not be considered an agency repre-
sentative for purposes of asserting
§7114 rights.
The FLRA states that narrowly
focusing on the collective bargaining
relationship in defining the scope of
the term "representative of the
agency" misconstrues the policy
behind §7114. A primary purpose
for union representation at investi-
gatory interviews is to provide pro-
tection for employees at risk of
agency disciplinary action. When
the interrogation is conducted by an
entity located within the agency,
which shares the information
obtained with the agency, the need
for protective representation is evi-
dent. The rights under §7114 per-
tain so long as the person conduct-
ing the interview represents the
agency, regardless of whether the
investigator and employee are
employed within the same adminis-
trative unit of the agency. While the
elimination of inequality in bargain-
ing power is a concern underlying
§7114, the primary rationale is to
protect against the risk of discipli-
nary action.
Lastly, NASA argues that imposing a
union representation requirement
on an OIG investigatory interview
would interfere with the OIG's abili-
ty to carry out its investigative func-
tions. The Inspector General Act
was designed to ensure that no
restrictions are placed on the OIG's
freedom to investigate. The pres-
ence of a union representative and
the concomitant role the represen-
tative plays would result in just
such restrictions. The presence of
a union representative would under-
mine the ability of the OIG to
maintain the confidentiality of the
investigation.
Moreover, the right to union repre-
sentation has been held to include
the right to be informed in advance
of the subject matter of the inter-
view, the right to halt the interview
and consult with the union repre-
sentative outside the hearing of the
investigator, and the right to negoti-
ate 48 hours advance notice of an
(Continued on Page 348)
American Bar Association
interview. The application of these
rights in the context of an OIG
investigation would disrupt the
investigative process and place
restrictions on how the investigation
is conducted, contrary to the intent
of the Inspector General Act.
On the other hand, the FLRA con-
tends that compliance with §7114
will not unduly restrain the conduct
of the investigation. The FLRA
argues, contrary to NASA's asser-
tion, that the Inspector General Act
does not impose a confidentiality
duty on the OIG. As the AFGE
points out, even if there is a duty of
confidentiality with regard to the
investigation, the interview itself
cannot be confidential. There is no
restriction placed on the employee
to prevent him or her from dis-
cussing the interview. Nor is there
any basis for concluding that the
presence of a union representative
poses any greater threat to the
integrity of the investigation than
the presence of the employee's
attorney, whose presence in such
interviews is uncontested. The pos-
sibility that circumstances could
arise in which union representation
would inappropriately interfere with
the OIG investigation does not
require a blanket denial of the right
to representation under all circum-
stances. The FLRA has the adminis-
trative expertise to tailor the appli-
cation of the right on a case-by-case
basis depending on the particular
facts involved.
On the issue of NASA's liability for
OIG's conduct, NASA asserts there
is no basis for holding NASA itself
liable. NASA-OIG is independent
from the head of NASA. There is no
statutory authority for the agency
head to prescribe the procedures
OIG must follow in conducting
investigations. Indeed, the agency
head is prevented by the Inspector
General Act from interfering in the
investigation. So, even if the NASA-
OIG investigator's conduct in
restricting the ability of the union
representative to participate in the
investigatory interview interfered
with the employee's rights under
§7114, NASA itself is not liable.
The FLRA counters that NASA-OIG
is a unit within NASA. As part of
their general supervision of OIG,
agency heads are responsible to
advise OIG of pertinent obligations
imposed by Congress in the
FSLMRS and to inform investigators
not to engage in conduct that inter-
feres with employee rights under
the law. Such general supervision
with regard to legal obligations
would not interfere with the con-
duct of OIG investigations. Holding
the agency liable for the conduct of
the OIG investigators will further
the purposes behind the FSLMRS by
ensuring compliance with the rights
guaranteed by the statute.
SIGNIFICANCE
Nearly 60 federal departments or
agencies have OIGs. Given the
broad scope of authority to conduct
both criminal and administrative
investigations within the agencies in
which they operate, OIG investiga-
tions can potentially have an impact
on thousands of federal workers.
Whether a worker has access to
union representation when con-
fronted by an OIG investigator can
mean the difference between pro-
tecting one's rights and effectively
responding to interrogation or being
overwhelmed and cornered. Even an
articulate and educated individual is
unevenly matched against a trained
investigator. The possibility for legal
representation may not be a viable
option for many employees, given
the cost associated with retaining
counsel. The Court's decision in this
case can either strengthen the fed-
eral government's hand in rooting
out abuses by limiting the ability of
workers to seek assistance during
investigations or provide protection




For National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, et al. (Seth
Waxman, Solicitor General, U.S.
Department of Justice (202) 514-
2217)
For the Federal Labor Relations
Authority (Davis M. Smith (202)
482-6620)
For the American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO
(Stuart A. Kirseh (770) 907-2055)
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of the Federal Labor




Employees Union (Gregory O'Duden
(202) 783-4444)
Issue No. 6
